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Abstract 
Several Nobel laureates economists have called for redistributive policies. This paper shows that 
there is a strong case for redistributive policies because the global increase of income inequality 
and wealth concentration was an important driver for the financial and Eurozone crisis. The 
high levels of income inequality resulted in balance of payment imbalances and rising debt 
levels. Rising wealth concentration contributed to the crisis because the increasing asset demand 
from the rich played a key role in the rise of the structured credit market and enabled poor and 
middle-income households to accumulate increasing amounts of debt. To tame the inherent 
instability of the current mode of capitalism it is necessary to reduce inequality. 
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1. Introduction 
Economic inequality has become a prominent topic in public debate after the publication of 
Piketty’s (2014) book Capital in the Twenty-First Century, which provides an overview about 
the global increase in income inequality and wealth concentration over the past 30 years. The last 
time that the topic reached such a prominence was in the 1930s when it was widely accepted that 
inequality was a cause for the Great Depression (Eccles, 1951; Galbraith, 1975). As a response 
policy makers of developed countries increased top marginal income and wealth taxes sharply, 
regulated markets, and strengthened the social welfare system during the middle of the twentieth-
century. The result of these policies, which went hand in hand with the post-war boom, was a 
sharp decline in inequality levels. 
During the 1970s “[s]lower growth, higher inflation and unemployment, and falling profits 
and stock prices created growing discontent with the economic status quo” (Crotty, 2012, p.83). 
This discontent by the ruling elite contributed to a push towards neoliberal policies so that most 
countries deregulated markets, strengthened corporate control and lowered personal and 
corporate taxes, resulting in a decline in labor’s bargaining power and a polarization of income to 
levels not seen since the 1930s (Stiglitz, 2012; Vidal, 2013; Piketty, 2014). The recent rise in 
income inequality and wealth concentration led Piketty (2014) to the conclusion that the 
introduction of a global progressive capital tax is necessary and also was the reason that several 
Nobel laureates economists made a call for more progressive income, estate and consumption 
taxes (Shiller, 2012; Stiglitz, 2012; Solow, 2014). 
One justification for such redistributional policies could be that the increase in inequality was 
a major contributing factor to the financial crisis of 2007-2009.1 Such a claim has been made by 
authors like Kumhof et al. (2012), Stiglitz (2012), Behringer and van Treeck (2013), and van 
Treeck (2014), who argue that rising income inequality was a root cause for the rapid growth of 
the US non-prime mortgage market and the global balance of payment imbalances that 
contributed to the Great Recession. Moreover, Lysandrou (2011a; 2011b), Milanovic (2011), 
Wisman (2013), and Goda and Lysandrou (2014) point out that the rise in the absolute 
concentration of wealth was an important contributing factor to the crisis, because the growing 
                                                            
1 There are other reasons why increasing inequality might be harmful, e.g. rising inequality fosters the influence on 
political decisions which undermines democratic institutions and diverts resources to the wealthiest sectors (Esteban 
and Ray, 2006; Gilens and Page, 2014). 
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demand from very rich individuals for investible securities was a major driver behind the growth 
of the structured credit market. 
However, these claims have remained to date a minority view. The debates about the financial 
crisis have mainly focused on the regulation of global financial markets (Kregel, 2008; Major, 
2012; Thiemann, 2014), central bank policy failures (Taylor, 2008; Golub et al., 2014), market 
failures (Ashcraft and Schuermann, 2008) and irrational behavior (Akerlof and Shiller, 2009). 
The aim of this paper is to analyze if the rise in inequality was a primary cause for the 
malfunctioning of the financial sector. To grasp the complex relationship between inequality and 
financial stability we will provide a framework that takes both sides of the inequality coin, 
income and wealth, equally into account. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper in 
the literature on the crisis that combines these two dimensions of inequality. The paper is also 
distinct in that it analyses the financial crisis in the US as well as the sovereign debt crisis in 
Europe. Both crises are interconnected, but often analyzed in isolation. We argue that the 
Eurozone crisis cannot be understood fully without taking into account the preceding events and 
the rise in inequality. 
The next section shows how the financial crisis began in the market for subprime derivatives 
and morphed into a financial crisis, an economic crisis and, in the Eurozone, in a sovereign debt 
crisis. Sections three and four discuss why the recent crisis is partly result of structural problems 
in the global economy that arose due to increasing inequality. The third section clarifies why 
income inequality was a main ingredient for the emergence of debt-led and export-led growth 
models, and an important reason behind the rise of current account imbalances. The fourth 
section illustrates how absolute wealth concentration contributed to these developments and 
argues that increasing wealth holdings at the top were a crucial driver behind the securitization of 
(subprime) loans. The overall findings of the paper are consolidated in section five and, finally, 
section six concludes with policy recommendations. 
 
2. From the US subprime crisis to the global financial crisis and the Eurozone crisis 
On the 9th of August 2007 the French bank BNP Paribas announced the complete evaporation 
of liquidity in the market for certain structured financial securities. The reason for this 
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announcement was that the super senior tranches of CDOs, which ought to be safe, started to 
suffer losses because of rapidly rising delinquency and foreclosure rates on US subprime 
mortgages. The collapse of the entire CDO market, in turn, led to uncertainty and panic in the 
global banking sector because the exact extent of the balance sheet risk exposure of financial 
institutions was unclear for market participants (Acharya et al., 2011; Shin, 2012). 
The subsequent breakdown in trust between large commercial banks (many of whom owned 
or sponsored investment vehicles that were directly exposed to this market segment) set in 
motion a liquidity-solvency crisis spiral, which in September 2008 culminated in the paralysis of 
the whole financial system when the world’s third largest investment bank, Lehman Brothers, 
declared bankruptcy and the insurance company American International Group (AIG) collapsed. 
The following flight to safe securities caused a decline in the government bond yields in OECD 
countries (most notably the US, UK and Germany), and interbank lending literally stopped. The 
freezing of the interbank market meant that banks started to hoard liquidity, with the result that 
most households and firms were no longer able to get access to credit. The result was a global 
recession in 2009. 
The final, on-going, phase of the crisis is the Eurozone crisis that started in 2010. One 
outcome of the financial crisis and the recession was that European governments needed to 
rescue two types of banks: (i) banks that bought the toxic securities that triggered the subprime 
crisis, and (ii) highly leveraged banks that had a maturity mismatch and could not roll-over their 
debt. Another outcome was that government revenues declined while spending increased due to 
the recession. Accordingly, public deficits and public debt increased sharply in nearly all 
Eurozone countries (Figure 1a). During 2008 and 2009 long-term government bond yields of 
these countries declined or stayed roughly stable due to the flight to safety by investors (Figure 
1b-c). However, in 2010 this situation started to change because investors became concerned 
about the sustainability of public finances in the Eurozone, leading to a rise in the refinancing 
costs for all countries. This increase in yields was relatively minor and temporary in those 
countries that had export-surpluses, whereas Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and to a lesser extent 
Spain – the so called GIPS countries – experienced a longer lasting increase in risk premia 
(Figure 1b-c). 
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as the refinancing costs for GIPS countries became too high. The accompanying austerity 
measures that were required from the European Commission, the European Central Bank (ECB) 
and the IMF –the so called Troika– were detrimental. They resulted in a decrease in domestic 
demand that contributed to a sharp increase in unemployment, social unrest, a long economic 
depression (Figure 1d), and a further rise in debt to GDP ratios (Figure 1a). 
This experience stands in stark contrast to that of current account surplus countries in the 
Eurozone. Due to their lower (private and public) debt levels and higher competitiveness of their 
exports, investors were confident that these countries are able to repay their debt more easily. 
Consequently, the demand for their bonds increased again in 2011, driving down their sovereign 
debt costs to historically low levels (Figure 1b). Moreover, this latter group of countries engaged 
in a policy of modest fiscal stimulus when the recession began, which contributed to their quick 
recovery from the 2009 recession, although initially they were hit hard by the recession as a 
result of the sharp decline of their exports. This recovery was only short lived however, with the 
result that in 2013 the growth of all Eurozone countries was either stagnating or negative (Figure 
1d). 
This analysis shows that the main cause for the Eurozone crisis was not so much the lack of 
fiscal discipline by some countries, as argued by many mainstream analysts (see e.g. Schuknecht 
et al., 2011; Costa and Ricciuti, 2013), but rather the outcome of the financial crisis and the 
deepening of current account imbalances within the region. Structural flaws of the European 
Monetary Union led to an escalation of the Eurozone crisis. Among these are a lack of 
instruments to cope with inflation rate differentials and financial bubbles, the lack of a 
coordinated fiscal policy, and a central bank that is mainly concerned with inflation targeting and 
reluctant to act as a lender of last resort for member states (Arestis and Sawyer, 2011; 
Stockhammer, 2011, 2014; Sawyer, 2013). The causes of the crisis thus lie in the imbalances that 
Europe had built up prior to the crisis and the reason for deepening of the crisis is related to the 
policy regime, but the initial trigger of the Eurozone crisis was the financial crisis. 
A distinctive feature of the pre-crisis era was an increase in income inequality within 
developed countries (Goda, 2013; Piketty, 2014) as well as a global increase in absolute wealth 
concentration at the top (Goda, 2014). While it is widely acknowledged that distributional issues 
have to figure somewhere in the plot of these events, the question arises if income inequality and 
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wealth concentration was at the very root of the recent crisis. The remainder of this paper intends 
to answer this question. 
 
3. Income inequality and debt- and export-led growth 
There has been a significant decline in the share of wages in GDP in both the developed and 
developing countries since the 1970s (Onaran and Galanis, 2012; OECD 2012; Stockhammer, 
2013b). Figure 2 shows the adjusted wage share in national income in the developed world.4 The 
share of wages has fallen by 10%-points in the Eurozone, and even more in Japan. In the English 
speaking countries a sharp polarization of personal income distribution and a rise in the 
remuneration of top managers has occurred since the 1980s (Atkinson et al., 2011). As can be 
seen in Figure 3, the share of the top 1% of the income distribution in the US has reached 18.3% 
of GDP in 2007 prior to the crisis exceeding the levels before World War I and the Great 
Depression; the UK followed a similar pattern. Since managerial wages are part of wages, this 
has led to a more modest decline in the wage share in the US and the UK compared to 
continental Europe. Top income shares did not experience the same surge in continental Europe, 
but in Germany a significant low wage segment emerged similar to the US and the UK (Vidal, 
2013). 
Whether the rise in personal income inequality was caused by a rise in top incomes or the 
generation of a low wage sector, in all the countries, a trend towards greater inequality in 
personal income distribution went along with the fall in the wage share. These developments 
indicate a clear reversal of the trends towards relatively egalitarian income distribution during 
the post-war era. Daudey and Garcia-Penalosa (2007), Dafermos and Papatheodorou (2011), and 
Wolff and Zacharias (2013) show that the rise of personal income inequality is related to changes 
in the wage share. The distribution of personal income depends on the distribution of labor and 
capital endowments, and the way in which aggregate output is shared between the two. If the 
distribution of capital is more unequal than that of labor, a decrease in the labor share would 
increase personal income inequality. 
                                                            
4 Wages are adjusted labour compensation (real compensation per employee multiplied by total employment). 
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Figure 2: Wage shares in Western countries, 1960-2013 
 
Note: Adjusted, ratio to GDP at factor cost (source: AMECO). 
Figure 3: Top 1% income shares in Western countries, 1886-2012 
 
Note: There is a break in the UK series in 1990 (source: World Top Incomes Database). 
A fall in the wage share reflects falling unit labor costs, and increasing profitability. 
Mainstream economic policy, informed by neoclassical economics, thus expects the decline in 
the wage share to be associated with stronger growth and employment. However, as can be seen 
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from the post-1980s average annual growth rates in GDP (Table 1), this has not been the case, in 
particular with the hindsight of the lost output since the Great Recession. 
Table 1: Average growth of real GDP in Western countries 
 
Source: AMECO 
This is a puzzle for mainstream economics, which focuses only on the role of wages as a cost 
item. But Post-Keynesian/Post-Kaleckian models5 suggest that wages have a dual role as a 
source of demand as well. A rise in inequality in the form of a fall in the share of wages will, 
other things equal, suppress domestic consumption since the marginal propensity to consume out 
of wages is higher than that out of profits. 6 However, it may also have a positive effect on 
investment due to increased profitability, and improved international competitiveness might lead 
to higher net exports due to lower unit labor costs. In order to assess the effects of wage 
moderation it is necessary to address the effects on all three components of private demand. If 
the differentials in marginal propensity to consume between wages and profits is relatively large, 
but the responsiveness of investment to profitability and exports and imports to relative price 
changes are low, then the total effect of the increase in the profit share on aggregate demand and 
hence growth would be negative, and the demand regime is called wage-led. If the effect is 
positive, it is called profit-led. The question whether the negative effect of lower wages on 
consumption or the positive effect on investment and net exports is larger is an empirical issue.  
                                                            
5 Post-Keynesian economics builds on Keynesian theory of effective demand. It deviates from mainstream 
Keynesianism in that it regards Keynes’ work as break with the neoclassical traditions. In particular Post-
Keynesians rejects the need for microfoundations and the marginal productivity theory of income distribution. Its 
monetary theory is based on the concept of fundamental uncertainty and highlights the possibility of financial crisis. 
It often uses class analysis as a foundation of macroeconomic analysis. Bhaduri and Marglin (1990) presents a good 
outline of the Post-Keynesian/Post-Kaleckian models. Lavoie (2009) and King (2002) offer introductions to Post-
Keynesian theory. 
6 The rise in personal income inequality is also expected to have a negative effect on consumption, since the 
marginal propensity to consume out of high income is lower than that out of low income. 
1961‐69 1970‐79 1980‐89 1990‐99 2000‐07 2008‐13
Eurozone (12 countries) 5.3 3.8 2.3 2.1 2.2 ‐0.3
United Kingdom 2.9 2.4 2.5 2.2 3.2 ‐0.3
United States 4.7 3.2 3.1 3.3 2.7 0.9
Japan 10.1 5.2 4.4 1.5 1.5 0.3
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Empirical research that have tried to identify these opposite effects (e.g. Hein and Vogel, 
2008; Stockhammer et al., 2009; Onaran and Galanis, 2012) suggest three important findings: 
Firstly, consumption reacts more sensitively to a decrease in the wage share than does 
investment, hence domestic demand (consumption and investment) is wage-led in all countries. 
The character of the demand and growth regimes thus depends crucially on the relevance of the 
net export effects. Secondly, the effects via the international trade channel depend on the 
elasticity of exports and imports to prices and labor costs as well as the degree of trade openness. 
Relatively closed large economies (like the US and Germany) tend to be wage-led as opposed to 
relatively small open economies, where net exports may play a major role in determining the 
overall outcome. Thirdly, in a large region like the Eurozone or in the current state of high 
international integration in the world economy the international competitiveness effects of 
declining wage shares are eliminated when the fall in the wage share takes place simultaneously 
across all countries. 
The findings related to the Eurozone are particularly interesting: even when individual small 
countries may be profit-led (e.g. Austria or Netherlands), large countries in the region tend to be 
wage-led (e.g. France and Germany). Furthermore, since wage shares fell simultaneously in all 
countries, there is little advantage of this for the net export position of each country because 
extra-Eurozone trade is comparatively small.7 The result is that domestic effects dominate the 
outcome when all Eurozone countries pursue “beggar thy neighbor” policies, because the 
international competitiveness effects are negligible. A decrease in the wage share in the 
Eurozone as a whole thus leads to lower growth rate (Onaran and Galanis, 2012). 
The expected outcome of the race to the bottom in the wage share in the global economy since 
the 1980s should, therefore, have been a stagnation of global demand and growth. So how did 
the world economy or individual countries managed to grow prior to the Great Recession? A 
stagnation in demand was circumvented by two distinct growth models: (i) a debt-led growth 
model in the US, UK, Australia in the core, and in the periphery in the GIPS and Eastern Europe; 
and (ii) an export-led growth model in Germany, Austria, and Japan in the core. The debt-led and 
the export-led growth models are complementary in that the export-led growth regimes can 
pursue mercantilist models only in the presence of debt-led deficit countries. Hence both rely on 
                                                            
7 Roughly two thirds of the external trade of Euro member states is within the Eurozone. 
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increasing accumulation of debt, and they are both equally fragile reflecting the global 
imbalances that have grown dramatically in the 2000s; the unsustainability of these global 
imbalances became evident in the aftermath of the Great Recession.  
At the root of both models lie different ways to react to the same chronic domestic demand 
deficiency due to declining wage shares. The way different countries dealt with this potential 
crisis of demand depended on their structural parameters regarding their position in the global 
value chains, history of industrial policies, employment relations, and differences in 
financialization. Financial deregulation of the 1980s and the role of the financial industry were 
strongest in the US and the UK. In the periphery of Europe, European integration and the 
liberalization of capital flows was determinant in making debt-led growth feasible.  
International financial deregulation made persistent long-term current account imbalances in 
the debt-led growth regimes feasible without major currency adjustments, which were in return 
financed by capital inflows from the export-led countries with persistent current account 
surpluses. In 2007, for example, Germany had a current account surplus of 7.5% of GDP, while 
the US had a deficit of 5.1%. After the liberalization of capital flows exchange rates were not 
adjusting to trade imbalances but were determined by capital flows chasing financial return. 
International financial liberalization has thus created the conditions for debt-led and export-led 
growth models to co-exist for extended periods as long as the financial investors find the debt 
situation in the debt-led growth models sustainable. 
As discussed in Section 2, within the Eurozone itself, the crisis laid bare former divergences 
caused by the process of European Monetary and Economic Unification. Productivity and 
production structures did not converge, and although inflation rates came down in all countries, 
the countries that had low inflation prior to the Euro also had lower inflation rates afterwards. 
This has led to the increasing divergence of nominal unit labor costs (Stockhammer and Onaran, 
2012) and resulted in sizable current account disequilibria across the Eurozone, which are mostly 
due to imbalances within the Eurozone rather than with countries outside Europe. 
Hence Southern and Eastern periphery of Europe has experienced massive capital inflows for 
more than a decade from the trade surplus countries, most of all Germany. As a result, massive 
external liabilities have been accumulated in the trade deficit countries, which financed debt-led 
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spending. In Greece it was mostly the government sector that accumulated debt, in Ireland, 
Portugal, and Spain it was rather the private sector, and in particular the household sector 
(Lapavitsas et al., 2010) – between 2000 and 2008 private household debt increased by  
26%-points in the US, 28%-points in the UK, and 61.7, 21.3 and 32.5%-points in Ireland, 
Portugal and Spain respectively, whereas it shrank in Germany by 11.3%-points (Stockhammer, 
2013a). 
In the debt-led countries, growth driven by increasing debt, financed by capital inflows led to 
asset and/or property price bubbles, which fuelled the increase in debt via equity withdrawals. In 
the export-led countries, on the contrary, net exports have provided the main driving force for 
demand. In the extreme case of Germany, three quarters of GDP growth has been driven by net 
exports since 2000 (Stockhammer and Onaran, 2012). 
How far does our argument differ from the existing literature? To begin with, most 
mainstream economics regards the crisis foremost as a financial issue (e.g. Blanchard, 2009; 
Brunnermeier, 2009; Roubini and Mihm, 2010), while distributional considerations are often 
disregarded. There are some exceptions though. Rajan (2010) contends that skill-biased 
technological change increased permanent inequality in the US, and, induced the US government 
to encourage credit growth in general and the subprime mortgage market in specific to expand 
consumption. Stiglitz (2009; 2011; 2012) also argues that aggregate demand would have been 
insufficient without a rise in private debt levels that “fuelled a consumption boom that allowed 
Americans to live beyond their means” (Stiglitz, 2012, p.54). In contrast to Rajan, for Stiglitz the 
main reasons for this situation were that poor and middle-income households tried to keep up 
with the richer parts of the society, and that rent seeking and asymmetric information led to 
market distortions.  
Kumhof and Ranciere (2010) develop a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) 
model with investors and workers, in which an increase in inequality results in rising debt of 
workers that is financed from savings from investors. As workers become over-indebted, the 
number of defaults increases, and, finally, a financial crisis emerges. A shortcoming of this 
model is that it does not involve asset and property price bubbles and that lending is solely 
driven by savings. In none of these mainstream contributions the emergence of different growth 
regimes and of a role of inequality in contributing to balance of payment imbalances are central. 
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The only exception is Kumhof et al. (2012), who extend the Kumhof and Ranciere (2010) model 
to a two country case where the rich population in countries with less developed financial 
markets finances the rising debt of the poor population in countries with more developed 
financial markets. However, this paper does not focus on the existing imbalances within the 
Eurozone, and it does not explain why countries with highly developed financial markets (like 
Germany) also have financed the poor population in other countries. 
Among Post-Keynesian and Marxian economists the issue of income distribution has featured 
more prominently and several authors have offered analyses that substantially overlap with ours 
(e.g. Barba and Pivetti, 2009; Foster and Magdoff, 2009; Horn and van Treeck, 2011; Palley, 
2012; van Treeck and Sturn, 2012; Behringer and van Treeck, 2013; Cynamon and Fazzari, 
2013; Vidal, 2013; van Treeck, 2014).8 In contrast to our analysis, most of the Marxist literature 
concentrates on overproduction – a surplus of capital with a lack of investment opportunities –, 
rarely distinguishes between different growth regimes and mainly focuses on US developments. 
Exceptions are Brenner (2009), Dumenil and Levy (2011) ), Lim and Khor (2011) and Vidal 
(2013) who discuss international imbalances and the importance of debt-led growth. 
Nevertheless the imbalances within the Eurozone are not discussed in relation to inequality.9 
This is also true for the above listed Post-Keynesian studies. 
We regard the two studies by Hein (2012) and Hein and Mundt (2012) closest to ours. Both 
identify rising inequality, rising household debt, global imbalances, and financial deregulation as 
the main causes of the financial and Eurozone crisis; and they distinguish between debt-led and 
export-led regimes. Their analysis is also based on a Kaleckian approach. However, the center of 
their analysis is the effects of financialization rather than income distribution and they do not 
discuss wealth distribution in much depth, to which we turn in the next section.   
                                                            
8 The importance of inequality is contested among heterodox economists. Some Marxists regard a declining profit 
rate as the prime cause underlying the crisis (see e.g. Freeman, 2010; Kliman, 2012), although Dumenil and Levy 
(2011) and Basu and Vasudevan (2013) report that profit rates recovered in the neoliberal period. Many Post-
Keynesians concentrate on financial regulation and/or Minskian instability to explain the financial crisis (see e.g. 
Kregel, 2008; Crotty, 2009; Wray, 2009). 
9 Lapavitsas et al. (2010) emphasizes the structural contradictions of the Euro as a single currency to explain the 
imbalances; their focus is not on inequality as a root cause of the sovereign debt crisis in Europe. 
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4. Wealth concentration, demand for assets and asset prices  
Prior to the current crisis, not only functional and personal income inequality but also the 
extent of wealth accumulation at the top increased dramatically. Wealth concentration can be 
measured in relative and absolute terms. Relative wealth concentration refers to the possession of 
disproportionate shares of wealth at the top. It is well documented that relative wealth 
concentration is normally higher than relative income concentration, and that the trend changes 
in top wealth shares (Figure 4) have been to some extent similar to that of top income shares 
(Figure 3). After World War I the extreme top wealth shares in Europe and the US decreased 
significantly, while they started to increase again from the late 1970s onwards.10 There exists 
very little data for countries from other regions but estimates suggest that within inequality has 
increased in most countries during the 2000s and that the global top 1% share currently is around 
46% of total global wealth (Goda, 2014). 
Figure 4: Top 1% wealth shares in Western countries, 1910-2010 
 
Note: Estimates of inequality of net worth between living adults (source: Piketty (2014)). 
In order to analyze the effect of wealth concentration on financial investment demand, it is 
important to consider changes in the absolute amount of global wealth holdings on the top of the 
                                                            
10 The data presented in Figure 3 is mainly based on estate tax data. Some data sources that are based on household 
survey data suggest that the increase of top income shares was not as pronounced as that presented in Figure 3 (see 
e.g. Wolff, 2010 for the US). It is likely that much of this discrepancy can be explained by top-coding, sampling 
errors, non-responses, and misreporting (Vermeulen, 2014). 
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wealth distribution. The amount of absolute wealth holdings is important insofar as they 
determine how much financial investment demand the wealthy people have, and the global pool 
rather than wealth in a single country in isolation is the relevant indicator as financial capital is 
highly mobile. Unfortunately, “official publications do not report estimates of absolute 
inequality” (Atkinson and Brandolini, 2010, p.3). However, some private wealth reports provide 
estimates of the amount of global wealth holdings of those individuals who have a net worth of 
at least US$1 million (primary residency excluded) – so called high net worth individuals 
(HNWIs). 
According to these reports, between 1986 and 2012 HNWIs’ wealth increased 6.6-fold – from 
US$ 7.2 trillion to US$ 46.2 trillion – and billionaires’ wealth even more than 15-fold (Goda, 
2014).11 The increase in absolute wealth concentration was especially steep in the years prior to 
the crisis. HNWIs’ net wealth increased more than 1.5-fold between 2002 and 2007, from 
US$26.7 to US$41 trillion12, while the global wealth holdings of billionaires increased 2.3-fold 
to US$3.5 trillion. This growth can be explained partly by the growth of the HNWI population 
(from 7.3 million to 10.1 million individuals) and partly by the increase of the mean wealth per 
HNWI (from US$3.66 million to US$4.03 million). The tremendous growth in wealth holdings 
at the top means that Rockefeller today would not be within the top 20 of the global billionaires 
list and that at the end of 2012 the four wealthiest men –Slim, Gates, Ortega, and Buffet– were 
more than twice as rich as Rockefeller was in 1937 (Goda, 2014). 
One reason for this increase of absolute wealth holdings of HNWIs was an increase in top 
incomes (Saez and Zucman, 2014). Personal income inequality and wealth concentration tend to 
be self-reinforcing because high income households save a higher proportion of their income and 
“wealth has a substantial impact on the share of income earned by those in the top 0.5 percent of 
the [adjusted gross income] distribution” (Tuttle and Gauger, 2006, p.506). Another reason for 
this exceptional increase in wealth concentration was the sharp increase of global stock market 
prices and real estate values, since increasing asset prices automatically translate into higher 
wealth holdings of their owners, who mainly belong to the richest segment of the population 
(Wolff, 2010).  
                                                            
11 During the same period global GDP only increased 4.8-fold in current terms. 
12 Different definitions and estimates of HNWIs’ wealth holdings exist (see Goda (2014) for an in-depth discussion). 
The figures presented in the text are lower bound estimates of HNWIs’ wealth. 
In co
in absol
the riche
rather th
investor
activitie
a ‘coup
and stoc
(2013, p
wealth, 
real-esta
hand in
Eurozon
increasi
(Figure 
existenc
as they 
to accum
Note: Ow
                
13 Betwee
190% in I
ntrast to inc
ute wealth a
r parts of th
an the real 
s’ profit ex
s into areas
on type of 
k market b
.922) claim
the elite fu
te boom” i
 hand with
e. An indic
ng continuo
5). The res
e of the abo
provided gr
ulate incre
Figur
n calculations
                      
n 1997 and 2
reland, while 
ome inequ
ccumulatio
e US and U
sector. The
pectations. 
 with highe
capitalism’ 
ubbles are
 that by “s
elled first a
n the US. 
 a sharp in
ation that th
usly and to
ulting price
ve discusse
eater collat
asing debt. 
e 5: HNW
 based on dat
                      
007, stock ma
house prices 
ality, few st
n at the top
K society 
 result is th
This ‘symp
r returns, an
in which th
 building-u
eeking prof
 stock mar
Between 19
crease in 
e former w
 a stronger
 rally in sto
d debt-led 
eral to low
Is’ net wea
a from Capge
rket prices inc
rose by 350%
udies discu
. Froud et a
are increasi
at compani
tom of low 
d (ii) to bo
e financial
p. Similarly
itable outle
ket boom a
97 and 20
stock mark
as driving t
 degree tha
ck and rea
growth regi
- and midd
lth and ass
mini & Merri
reased by 32
 in Ireland, 30
ss possible 
l. (2001) ar
ngly invest
es cannot g
returns’ for
ost their sh
 sector bec
, Wisman 
ts for its dr
nd then, aft
07 increasi
et and hou
he latter is 
n the asset
l estate ma
me in the U
le-income h
et prices, I
ll Lynch, Dal
0% in Greece
0% in Spain, 
economic e
gue that ho
ed in existin
enerate eno
ces compan
are prices, b
omes more
and Baker 
amatically i
er the high
ng global w
sing prices
that global 
 prices in t
rkets, in tur
S, the UK 
ouseholds,
ndex (1997
las Fed; OEC
, 280% in Spa
and 250% in G
ffects of th
usehold sav
g financial
ugh returns
ies (i) to d
oth of whi
 and more 
(2012) and
ncreased in
-tech bubbl
ealth hold
 in the US
wealth hold
he US and 
n, contribu
and GIPS c
 which enab
 = 100) 
D, ECB. 
in, 220% in P
reece. 
16 
e increase 
ings from 
 securities 
 to satisfy 
ivert their 
ch lead to 
important 
 Wisman 
come and 
e burst, a 
ings went 
 and the 
ings were 
Eurozone 
ted to the 
ountries13 
led them 
ortugal and 
17 
Political economists also have acknowledged that the toxic securities that triggered the crisis 
were partly created because “there is a growing ‘wall of money’ facing global financial markets 
that is looking for investment opportunities” (Engelen et al., 2010, p. 47), which means that the 
crisis “is also a story of the financialization of consumer credit networks [that enabled] lenders of 
all kinds to generate new assets” (Langley, 2008, pp. 136-137). However, in these discussions 
wealth concentration normally is not mentioned but instead emphasis is laid on rising asset 
demand from institutional investors, governments and sovereign wealth funds. This is clearly a 
shortcoming, given the above discussed increase in wealth concentration at the top and the fact 
that in 2007 HNWIs had more asset under management (US$41 trillion) than global pension 
funds (US$28 trillion), mutual funds (US$26 trillion) and insurance companies (US$20 trillion) 
(IFSL, 2008). 
Two authors that have addressed this shortcoming are Milanovic (2011) and Wisman (2013), 
although in a different manner. Milanovic states that “[h]igh-net-worth individuals and the 
financial sector were … keen to find new lending opportunities” (p.195) to overcome a shortage 
of investment opportunities, while Wisman (2013, p.940) argues that “investment funds were 
being switched from production to speculation, which stimulated innovations in credit 
instruments”. However, both authors do not specify a concrete transmission mechanism. 
Lysandrou (2011a; 2011b) is the first author to theorize the link between the increase in absolute 
wealth concentration and CDO production in more detail. His argument is that the increasing 
financial investment demand from HNWIs contributed to a global shortage of investible 
securities. To alleviate this shortage the market for CDOs was rapidly expanded. Lysandrou does 
not provide empirical evidence for his claim though. To give credibility to this theory it needs to 
be shown that (i) one driving force behind the mortgage securitization growth was a fall in the 
yield of traditional debt securities, (ii) HNWIs contributed to this fall, and (iii) these individuals 
also created a demand pressure for CDOs. 
Evidence regarding the first point has been provided by Caballero et al. (2009), Bernanke 
(2011), and Goda et al. (2013). Especially after 2000 many emerging market economies (EMEs) 
were experiencing high growth rates, but their debt security market could not keep up with this 
development. EMEs’ bond markets stayed ‘underdeveloped;’ at the end of 2007 the EMEs’ share 
in global GDP was one-third whereas their share in world debt security markets was only ten 
18 
percent (IMF, 2008). Due to this global mismatch investors were increasingly ‘forced’ to invest 
in the US where most financial assets are produced (Caballero and Krishnamurthy, 2008). The 
resulting capital inflows not only helped to finance the debt-led growth model of the US, but also 
led to the phenomena that the supply of traditional investment grade debt securities could not 
keep up with the growing global demand for these securities. Government purchases from export 
surplus countries like China lowered long term yields of US Treasury and agency bonds, while 
foreign and domestic private investor demand reduced US agency, corporate, and municipal 
bonds yields (Bernanke, 2011; Bertaut et al., 2012; Goda et al., 2013). The depressed yields, in 
turn, led to a search for alternative debt securities with a higher yield. Various studies have 
therefore concluded that “an excess safe asset demand on the part of investors was a chief force 
that drove the expansion of the US CDO market well beyond what was prudent” (Goda et al., 
p.135). 
But, in how far were HNWIs involved in this global excess demand? To answer this question, 
Goda and Lysandrou (2014) estimates the size of HNWIs’ US bonds holdings and their 
involvement in the demand pressure. According to their findings, more than half of HNWIs 
wealth is comprised of financial securities of which around half is comprised of debt securities. 
Moreover, HNWIs bond holdings are heavily skewed towards the US market which is by far the 
biggest and most liquid market in the world. The rise in HNWIs wealth holdings thus meant that 
global HNWIs increased their total holdings of US bonds by around forty percent between mid-
2004 (US$2.1 trillion) and mid-2007 (US$2.9 trillion).14 This increase was restricted to US 
agency, corporate and municipal bonds, whereas their US Treasury holdings declined slightly. 
This pattern can be explained by the fact that private investors were squeezed out of the latter 
market due to the steeply increasing demand for Treasuries from foreign governments (especially 
from China). The rise in HNWIs non-Treasury bond holdings meant that very rich individuals 
depressed long-term bond yields of AAA-rated US agency, corporate and municipal bonds “to a 
similar degree as changes in business cycle expectations, interest rate volatility and default risk” 
(Goda and Lysandrou, 2014, p.13). This result suggests that HNWIs significantly contributed to 
                                                            
14 Goda and Lysandrou (2014) estimate that around 60% of US individual bond holdings were held by US HNWIs 
prior to the crisis, while 20% to 30% of foreign private bond holdings stemmed from rest of the world HNWIs. 
Different estimates by Hager (2014) confirm that US bond holdings are concentrated in the hands of the top 1% of 
the population. 
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the above mentioned shortage of traditional debt securities, which triggered a ‘search for yield’ 
by all global investors that helped to encourage the demand for CDOs. 
As regards the third point it has to be shown that HNWIs also were involved in the demand 
pressure for CDOs. Rich investors were not directly involved in this market, but indirectly via 
hedge funds, who held nearly half of all issued CDOs by June 2007 (Blundell-Wignall, 2007). 
The absence of rich individuals’ direct involvement most likely can be explained by the complex 
nature of CDOs15, whereas the dominant position of hedge funds can be mainly explained by two 
factors: (i) the exceptional growth of this industry16, and (ii) the pressure that they faced to 
generate above average yields by the investors whose funds were managed by the hedge funds. 
An important driver behind this growth and pressure was the increasing investment of HNWIs, 
who increased their hedge fund assets approximately from US$500 billion to US$1,1 trillion 
between 2002 and 2007 (Goda and Lysandrou, 2014). 
Hedge fund managers were contented with their growing asset base, but it also provided them 
with a problem. To maximize returns hedge funds rely on leverage, and to get access to cheap 
credits they need to provide investment grade collateral to banks. Given that investment grade 
bonds had historical low yields, hedge funds needed to find an alternative that was accepted by 
banks and at the same time kept borrowing costs to a minimum. CDOs were the solution to this 
problem. Their senior tranches could be used as collateral that gave a decent return, while their 
equity tranches were seen as high yielding investment opportunity whose risk could be 
controlled by using put options and credit default swaps17. This strategy allowed hedge funds to 
generate an above average return for their clients and high bonus payments for themselves, and 
at the same time generated demand for banks to supply increasing amounts of CDOs. This 
analysis suggests that the historical high level of absolute wealth concentration is crucial to 
                                                            
15 An owner of ordinary government and debt securities can easily find out how risky the investment is and in how 
far the risk of default changes over time. The same is true for asset-backed security (ABS) investors as the backing 
collateral normally also consists of a single, homogenous class of assets. CDOs, by contrast, do not meet this 
transparency criterion as they are backed by many different types of asset classes (in their simplest form a CDO is 
an ABS of many ABS). That is why each CDO’s price is negotiated over the counter by the seller and the buyer, i.e. 
in contrast to conventional fixed income securities, CDOs have no standard prices. As a result, “wealthy individuals 
did not have the requisite expertise to participate [directly] in this market” (Lysandrou, 2011-12, p.227). 
16 Hedge funds’ assets under management more than tripled between 2002 and 2007, reaching US$2.2 trillion in 
2007.  
17 Put options enabled hedge funds to sell an equity tranche at a specified date at a specified price. Credit default 
swaps gave hedge funds the right to be compensated in the case of default. 
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explain why the CDO market reached a size that was sufficiently large to endanger the global 
financial system when it collapsed in August 2007.  
 
5. Synthesis 
Rising income inequality and wealth concentration have contributed to the crisis in complex 
but essential ways. Figure 6 summarizes our argument. Rising income inequality has led to 
potentially stagnant demand, because the world economy overall is in a wage-led demand 
regime. In Neoliberalism this has been overcome via either debt-led or export-led growth 
models. The debt-led growth model relied on asset and property bubbles to generate credit that 
ultimately fuelled consumption. This allowed working class households to maintain growing 
consumption while their incomes stagnated (in particular in the US and the UK). These countries 
usually had large current account deficits and effectively played the role of a growth engine of 
the world economy. The export-led growth model had stagnant domestic demand and used net 
export growth as the source of demand growth. Both growth models are intrinsically unstable, 
since they both rely on increasing debt to income ratios. In the debt-led model household debt 
has risen to allow for growth. However, the export-led growth model also relies on rising debt, 
but it is not domestic debt, but rising foreign debt of its trade partners. The debt-led and export-
led growth models are thus complementary and they result in rising household debt, international 
imbalances and rising international debt. 
Rising wealth concentration played an important role in providing the finance for these 
unstable growth regimes. Rich households (or their trusts) save differently from working class 
households: they save a higher share of their income and hold riskier assets. The superrich, or 
more technically, HNWIs, played a crucial role in that (i) their increasing asset demand helped to 
lower the yield of traditional bond classes, which put pressure on investors to seek alternative 
investment grade fixed income securities that provided higher yields, and (ii) HNWIs were the 
main investors in hedge funds18, which, in turn, were the main buyers of CDOs. HNWIs thus 
helped to create the institutions that aggressively developed new financial instruments and, 
ultimately, they provided the funding for subprime loans and growing credit more broadly. 
                                                            
18 HNWIs remained the main investor in hedge funds throughout the whole pre-crisis period despite the increasing 
involvement of institutional investors in this market (Lysandrou, 2011b). 
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Several topics for future research emerge: First, the interaction between the different growth 
regimes needs further analysis. In particular the contribution of capital inflows to asset and 
property price bubbles in advanced economies is under-researched. Second, the effect of 
inequality on the growing demand for financial innovation, speculation and fragility deserves a 
lot more attention than it has hitherto received. Third, there is need to develop macroeconomic 
models that explicitly deal with the link between income distribution, asset prices and wealth 
distribution. 
 
6. Policy recommendations 
An important policy implication arising out of this analysis is that a more egalitarian 
distribution of income is not a luxury that can be taken care of once the crisis and regulatory 
issues have been resolved, but that it is necessary to reverse the actual level of absolute wealth 
concentration and income inequality to help contain the inherent problems of the current mode of 
capitalism. Given that income inequality and absolute wealth concentration have increased 
further since the outbreak of the crisis (OECD, 2013; Goda, 2014), decisive government 
intervention seems necessary to achieve this aim.   
The policy mix requires both the restoration of the link between productivity and real wage 
growth and progressive taxes and social policies. Hence minimum wages should increase 
automatically in line with inflation and productivity and the bargaining power of workers should 
be strengthened through changes in the union legislation and collective bargaining coverage as 
well as strengthening the welfare state and taming the mobility of capital and regulating finance.  
With regard to taxes, we agree with Piketty (2014) that a wealth tax is needed. Additionally, 
top marginal income and estate taxes should be raised. An indexation of these taxes would be an 
appropriate solution to avoid very high concentrations of income and wealth. One possible rule 
would be to link top income and wealth taxes to median incomes and wealth holdings. Possible 
thresholds for developed countries could be a highest marginal tax rate of 70% for income above 
10 times the median income, of 10% on all personal net wealth (excluding primary residence) 
that is above 100 times the median wealth, and of 90% for all inheritance that are above 100 
times the median wealth.  
23 
This proposal might seem very radical at first sight, but it is not. In the four decades before 
Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan came to power the UK and the US had top marginal 
income tax rates of at least 70% and wealth taxes were common in OECD countries. As existing 
governance arrangements allow the rich to be highly mobile and secretive, these policies need to 
be implemented on a global or at least regional scale. Moreover, tax avoidance and evasion 
opportunities have to be closed off through the implementation of tougher regulations. The 
accruing new government revenues should be used for public services like education, health, 
care services for children and elderly, the reduction of value added taxes for non-luxury goods, 
and for green investment programs. 
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